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same might be true for those living on an African-American inner-
city “atoll” within a predominantly Caucasian middle-class city.
Once an emphasis on group rather than individual processes is es-
tablished, the situations in which that understanding is fostered
become criterial and could tend to self-perpetuation. But what
may work well on an atoll may not work elsewhere – what is bet-
ter, more complete, or more adequate in one social or cultural sit-
uation may not be so in another.
That being said, there is still no reason per se why cultural vari-
ability need go hand-in-hand with a view of passive transmission
of mental concepts to the child. The child is influential not only in
constructing his or her understanding but also in defining the con-
text in which learning takes place, and even the content of what
should be learned. Furthermore, individuals are not the only
things that interact in relationship – groups, societies, cultures all
relate and influence one another.
In short, although I applaud C&L’s efforts to make social inter-
action the center of development, rather than merely an add-on
explanatory variable, I feel they are not radical enough. Seeing tri-
adic interactions as the epicenter of development does not neces-
sitate relegating cultural variability to the sidelines. Children’s de-
velopment is not constructive only in the sense that they gradually
cobble together cultural criteria for language use and other be-
haviors. It is also constructive because part of their development
consists in constructing the criteria for themselves and for others.
Without this active transforming of the world, caregivers would
never adapt to their children, peers would never learn how to
pacify or enrage their playmates, and societal and cultural change
would not exist.
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Abstract: The view that children’s understanding of mind is constructed
through social interaction is consistent with other social-constructivist
models. We provide examples of similar claims in research on emotion per-
ception, pretense understanding, autobiographical memory, and event
knowledge. Identification of common elements from such socio-cultural
perspectives may lead to greater theoretical integration and provide a new
framework for exploring human development.
Carpendale & Lewis (C&L) propose that the development of 
understanding of others’ minds grows not from a kernel of knowl-
edge already in a child’s brain, nor from the assumption of envi-
ronmental-cultural norms, but through dynamic, ongoing inter-
actions with caregivers and the physical world. This is a welcome
step into the already burgeoning literature in a number of areas
– motor development, cognitive development, socio-emotional
development – spurred by theories such as dynamic systems, the
ecological approach, and contextual approaches. The view that
children’s understanding of mind is part of the larger process of
social understanding and is constructed through social interac-
tion is consistent with other models that attribute a critical role
to the process of social interaction in development. We provide
examples of similar claims in research on the development of the
perception of emotion, pretense understanding, autobiographi-
cal memory, and event knowledge. These lines of research pro-
vide support for the notion that richness of experience, not rich
interpretation, provides an interpretive framework for under-
standing children’s emerging understanding. They also indicate
that social interaction is fundamental to human development
across a wide range of social, emotional, cognitive, and perceptual
phenomena.
C&L argue that development of an understanding of others’
minds (intentions, beliefs, emotions) is not “all or none.” Research
on infants’ understanding of emotional expressions supports this
contention. Whether an infant perceives an emotional expression
and responds to it depends on the age of the infant, the expression
that is being enacted, the task by which the experimenter mea-
sures perception, the definition of perception (detection, dis-
crimination, recognition, understanding), and the context in
which the expression is encountered (Walker-Andrews 1997). In-
fants as young as three months show intermodal matching for
their mothers’ happy and sad facial-vocal expressions, but not for
expressions posed by a female stranger (Kahana-Kalman &
Walker-Andrews 2001) Similarly, infants show intermodal match-
ing for fathers’ happy and sad facial-vocal expressions only when
they have highly involved fathers (Montague & Walker-Andrews
2002). Lest one think that this is because infants are merely ex-
posed to maternal expressions more than paternal expressions, re-
fer to research by Dunn and colleagues (Dunn et al. 1991a; 1991b)
that illustrates the importance of the family context and interac-
tions in the perception of emotion by children.
Children’s understanding of the pretense of others also devel-
ops gradually (Harris 1994b). For example, Walker-Andrews and
Kahana-Kalman (1999) concluded in a study of pretense under-
standing that “toddlers move from appreciating that an adult part-
ner initiated a game of pretend to understanding the pretend stip-
ulations of the adult, and finally, at 24 months, to using that
understanding to enter into collaborative pretend play” (p. 531).
In particular, some 15- and 18-month-olds imitated the experi-
menter’s pretend transformations as a way to coordinate actions
with the experimenter. To borrow from the description of chil-
dren’s involvement in deception, the toddlers entered into the
pretense “with only partial understanding and such experience is
the context for learning” (target article, sect. 4.1, para. 6) about
such mental states as pretense and deception. The comprehension
of another’s pretense emerges early in the second year, but the
ability to tailor one’s pretend actions in that interaction is not
demonstrated until later.
C&L propose that conversation provides a context for children
to interpret and talk about the mental world. Conversation also
provides a context for thinking and talking about past events, as
demonstrated by extensive research on the development of young
children’s autobiographic memory (Reese 2002). Although chil-
dren’s contributions to conversations at two to three years consist
solely of short answers to specific questions, over time, children
develop the narrative skills to discuss the past more fully and to
eventually construct independent memory narratives (Haden et
al. 1997; Hudson 1990; Nelson 1993). Through conversation chil-
dren learn how to remember, not what to remember; they do not
simply repeat what was told to them but acquire memory and nar-
rative skills (Hudson 1990). This distinction is similar to C&L’s ar-
gument that through social interaction, children do not simply
adopt socially available knowledge, but rather, construct their own
understandings within the interactional context. Research has also
shown that individual differences in parents’ reminiscing style af-
fect children’s independent narrative ability in later years, indi-
cating that characteristics of the dyadic relationship influence chil-
dren’s autobiographic memory development (Reese et al. 1993).
Finally, research on the development of event knowledge illus-
trates the tension between performance factors and underlying
competence discussed by C&L. A large body of research has
shown that children’s generalized event representations (GERs)
provide a cognitive context for the development of memory, plan-
ning, narrative, inferential reasoning, and temporal understanding
(Nelson 1986). Before children display these skills in novel, de-
contextualized, experimental tasks, they accurately use temporal
language, draw appropriate inferences, construct future plans, re-
member stories and events, and construct story narratives when
reasoning about familiar events in meaningful interactive contexts
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(Hudson 1993; Hudson et al. 1995). This reprises the issue of the
role of partial understanding in development. Researchers exam-
ining the role of event knowledge in children’s cognitive develop-
ment have argued that knowledge displayed within familiar con-
texts provides the foundation for later, more generalized skill. Just
as a lexicon for talking about the mental world provides children
with a cognitive resource for reflection and interpretation, chil-
dren’s GERs allow initial “understanding-in-action” to be consol-
idated through reflection on internal event representations.
We propose that a more social-interactional approach is needed
at this stage of social-constructivist theory development. All of
these lines of research stem from approaches emphasizing the so-
cial-cultural embeddedness of development. Although specific
mechanisms may vary, they constitute a “family” of social con-
structivist approaches. Our single concern with the C&L model is
that it may not be adequately inclusive. The tendency to label as
“passive enculturation” approaches that vary in small degrees
from the C&L position may limit the potential for integration
across research domains. Rather than focusing on differences
from an individualist framework, joint attention on common prin-
ciples and collaborative interactions may be more fruitful for the-
ory development.
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Abstract: Carpendale & Lewis (C&L) propose that social knowledge is
constructed from triadic interactions. This account generates testable pre-
dictions concerning social knowledge in infancy. Current evidence is not
entirely consistent with these predictions. Infants possess action knowl-
edge before they engage in triadic interactions, and triadic use of an ac-
tion does not always precede knowledge about the action.
Carpendale & Lewis (C&L) propose an ontogenetic relation be-
tween interacting and knowing: By participating in increasingly
well-organized social exchanges, children come to construct a
theory of mind. Evaluating this proposal requires measuring both
social actions and social knowledge. Given this requirement,
C&L’s review reveals striking gaps in the empirical record. The in-
fant work presented concerns assessments of social behavior, al-
though underlying social cognition (or lack thereof) is only in-
ferred. The studies of older children concern social cognition as
assessed in interview studies, with factors such as parenting style
standing as proxies for children’s social interactions. A full account
must address both gaps. We will focus on the first.
C&L propose that triadic interactions, in which the infant and
caretaker mutually coordinate attention on the same object, are
necessary for the construction of social knowledge and, ultimately,
a theory of mind. Because infants do not engage in triadic inter-
actions until the end of the first year of life, this account predicts
that they have not yet begun to construct social knowledge. C&L
further predict that, once triadic interactions are established, so-
cial behavior relevant to a particular aspect of intentional knowl-
edge will emerge before the knowledge itself does. Recent evi-
dence from our laboratory and others’ speaks to these predictions.
This evidence indicates that triadic interactions and social knowl-
edge do not always travel together in ontogeny.
Aspects of social knowledge are present months before infants
engage in triadic interactions. Infants represent actions not as
purely physical motions through space but rather as directed at
objects or states of affairs (Baldwin et al. 2001; Csibra et al. 2003;
Gergely et al. 1995; Moore 1999; Woodward 1998; Phillips et al.
2002). To illustrate, in one study (Woodward 1998), 6-month-old
infants viewed a person reaching for and grasping an object. Fol-
lowing habituation, infants demonstrated a stronger novelty re-
sponse to test events that disrupted the relation between agent
and object than to test events that maintained this relation while
varying the spatial properties of the reach. Infants did not respond
in this way when viewing inanimate objects that touched or
grasped other objects, or when viewing manual contact that ap-
peared purposeless to adults (Woodward 1999). Therefore, in-
fants’ social knowledge reflects a foundational aspect of mature
conceptions of intentional action – namely, that certain human ac-
tions are object-directed (see Barresi & Moore 1996).
This work highlights infants’ knowledge about instrumental ac-
tions. C&L focus on interactions in which infant and caregiver
share attention, as expressed by looking and pointing. But these
are just a subset of the actions that adults view as intentional. In-
deed, many investigators have elucidated infants’ developing abil-
ity to extract the goals behind observed instrumental actions
(Gergely et al. 2002; Meltzoff 1995; Wenner & Bauer 1999; Wood-
ward & Sommerville 2000). Our recent findings are consistent
with the thesis that experience contributes to infants’ construction
of social knowledge; however, in this case what matters appears to
be infants’ experience of acting on objects rather than of partici-
pating in triadic interactions (Sommerville & Woodward, in press).
Recent studies also elucidate infants’ knowledge about the ac-
tions involved in triadic exchanges. Infants begin to follow gaze
during the first year of life, but, as many have noted, this observa-
tion alone does not tell us whether infants understand the “look-
ing at” relation (e.g., Barresi & Moore 1996). Several studies in-
dicate that by 12 months, infants encode looking and pointing as
relational (Moore 1999; Phillips et al. 2002; Woodward 2003;
Woodward & Guajardo 2002). Prior to 12 months, infants respond
to gaze by orienting their own attention but seem not to encode
the relation between looker and object (Woodward 2003). This
pattern of findings is consistent with C&L’s proposal. Infants be-
gin to understand the looking relation after several months of re-
sponding appropriately to shifts in others’ gaze.
However, the emergence of pointing suggests that this pattern
does not hold in all cases. Knowledge about pointing is evident be-
fore infants employ it robustly in triadic interactions. Infants’ first
points are often described as indexing their own attention rather
than being communicative (Bates et al. 1979; Schaffer 1984a). It
is not until 12 to 15 months of age that infants produce points in
a clearly communicative manner and follow others’ points to their
distant referents (Bakeman & Adamson 1986; Carpenter et al.
1998; Desrochers et al. 1995). Furthermore, infants do not use
contextual cues to determine when to point until around their sec-
ond birthday (e.g., Dunham et al. 2000; Moore & D’Entremont
2001). Consistent with the thesis that experience is related to
knowledge, at 10 months, those infants who produce object-di-
rected (but not clearly communicative) points understand ob-
served points as relational (Woodward & Guajardo 2002). There-
fore, although experience may contribute to infants’ knowledge
about pointing, the evidence suggests that the relevant experience
is not triadic in nature.
To conclude, recent findings indicate that although triadic in-
teractions may be one source of infants’ social knowledge, they are
not the sole source. Infants are sensitive to the object-directed-
ness of instrumental actions well before the onset of triadic inter-
actions and come to understand certain actions before using them
in triadic interaction. In addition to interaction, firsthand agentive
experience is a likely contributor to this system of knowledge. That
is, there seems to be more than one route into social understand-
ing. This may account for the fact that all normally developing
children construct a theory of mind despite the existence of broad
cross-cultural variation in the nature of early triadic interactions
and habits of talk about the mind (Lillard 1998; Rogoff et al. 1993).
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